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I. Introduction
An enormous increase in central bank transparency over the last two decades has attracted extensive research efforts aimed at uncovering the implications of increased transparency (Blinder et al., 2009 , Geraats, 2009 . While theoretical research has mainly focused on the welfare effects of increased transparency (Morris and Shin, 2002 , Angeletos and Pavan, 2007 , Cornand and Heinemann, 2008 , Dale et al., 2011 , Hahn, 2012 , empirical research has examined the implications of increased transparency with respect to monetary policy predictability (Gerlach-Kristen, 2004 , Crowe, 2010 , Sturm and de Haan, 2011 , Horvath et al., 2012a , macroeconomic outcomes (Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014) and dissent among central bankers (Meade and Stasavage, 2008) .
In this paper, we analyze whether central banks' voting records help predict the future course of monetary policy, a question that has been examined by GerlachKristen (2004) and Horvath et al. (2012a) . The seminal paper of Gerlach-Kristen (2004) examines the Bank of England voting record and constructs the variable skew, defined as the difference between the average policy rate voted for by individual committee members 1 and the policy rate that is the outcome of the majority vote. We extend these two studies in two directions. First, we update them to cover the period of the global financial crisis, a period characterized by a high degree of economic uncertainty. The theoretical model of Horvath et al. (2010) shows that voting records should be informative about future monetary policy unless the economic environment is too volatile, in which case, voting records are too noisy.
Therefore, our sample allows us to test the hypothesis with actual data, thus determining whether it is indeed the case that voting records lose predictive power in more uncertain economic environments. In addition, we also examine whether the size of skew matters for the probability of policy rate change to shed more light on how many board members have to dissent so that the future policy rate change is highly likely.
Second, Gerlach-Kristen (2004) and Horvath et al. (2012a) examine whether voting records help predict the monetary policy rate at the next meeting (i.e., at time t+1).
We examine whether voting records are informative about monetary policy meetings not only at time t+1 but also times t+2 and t+3. It may well be that some "early birds" receive a signal about the appropriate course of monetary policy "too early", and it may take some time for other central bankers to recognize this signal and finally change the policy rate in an optimal way.
We find that central banks' voting records help predict the monetary policy rate set at the next monetary policy meeting in all central banks, except Hungary. This is an interesting result in light of concerns about central bank independence in Hungary (see, for example, Reuters, 2014, among 
others). The European Central Bank (ECB)
expressed its concerns about the lack of Hungarian central bank independence in a legal opinion issued on January 31, 2014 (ECB, 2014 . Therefore, the financial markets may pay less attention to the voting records released by the Hungarian central bank. Our findings regarding Hungary broadly correspond with Jung and Kiss (2012) and Eijffinger et al. (2013a) .
In addition, we find that voting records are informative, to a certain extent, about monetary policy meetings at times t+2 and t+3. However, if we restrict our sample period to the period of the global financial crisis, we find that voting records are never significant and therefore are uninformative about future monetary policy. This finding supports the hypothesis that voting records are informative unless the economic environment is too volatile. Finally, we find that the probability of policy rate change increases with the size of skew and that many central bankers precedes the collective decision and may be considered as "early birds".
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. A literature survey is provided in section 2. Our model is presented in section 3. Section 4 provides our empirical results. Concluding remarks are presented in section 5. An appendix, including a description of the data, additional figures and regression results, follows.
II. Literature Survey of Central Bank Voting
We provide a very brief literature survey in this section, largely focusing on theoretical and empirical research that examines whether central bank voting records help forecast future policy adjustments. We refer the reader to the following more comprehensive surveys. Reis (2013) 
III. Empirical Model
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Interestingly, dissent at monetary policy meetings is highest in Hungary. On the one hand, this might be attributed to the larger number of board members at the 25.6.2007 29.10.2007 25.2.2008 23.6.2008 20.10.2008 19.1.2009 25.5.2009 28.9.2009 25.1.2010 31.5.2010 27.9.2010 24.1.2011 16.5.2011 20.9.2011 24.1.2012 29.5.2012 25.9.2012 29.1.2013 28.5.2013 24.9.2013 21.1.2014 27.5.2014 A positive (negative) value of skew indicates that some central bankers preferred higher (lower) rates than the majority. Our hypothesis is that when skew is positive, a future interest rate hike is more likely. The evolution of skew over time is available in Figure 1 . Skew frequently differs from zero in all central banks.
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Using our skew measure, we estimate regressions of the following form:
The term We extend the framework of Gerlach-Kristen (2004) and Horvath et al. (2012a) in the following way. We estimate Eqs. (3) and (4) and test whether voting records, controlling for current policy and financial market expectations, predict monetary policy rate changes two and three meetings ahead. Therefore, the dependent variable ∆i t+1 is replaced by ∆i t+2 and ∆i t+3 in Eqs. (3) and (4), respectively. If we examine the voting patterns of individual bank board members, we observe that some early birds were followed by the majority with a lag greater than one monetary policy meeting (more on this in our results section).
We estimate Eqs. (2)- (4) for both the full sample and the restricted sample -the period of the global financial crisis, which we define as the period from August 2007 onwards.
If we examine scatter plots between skew and future monetary policy, we observe, as expected, a positive relationship between skew and the monetary policy rate change at t+1. This is seen in Figure 2 . The positive relationship is also observed for t+2 and t+3 but only for certain central banks (see Figures 3 and 4) . Nevertheless, the scatter plots are merely indicative, as they do not control for financial market expectations.
In addition, the regression framework reduces the importance of vertical outliers (e.g., rare but large interest rate hikes or cuts).
Figure 2 -Voting Record skew in t and Policy Rate Change in t+1
Notes: Skew (in%), plotted on the x-axis, is calculated as the difference between the average rate voted for by individual board members and the actually-implemented rate at policy meetings at time t. Monetary policy rate changes at policy meetings at t+1 are plotted on the y-axis. For expositional purposes, jitter is used for overlapping observations. Notes: Skew (in%), plotted on the x-axis, is calculated as the difference between the average rate voted for by individual board members and the actually-implemented rate at policy meetings at time t. Monetary policy rate changes at policy meetings at t+2 are plotted on the y-axis. For expositional purposes, jitter is used for overlapping observations. 
Figure 4 -Voting Record skew in t and Policy Rate Change in t+3
Notes: Skew (in%), plotted on the x-axis, is calculated as the difference between the average rate voted for by individual board members and the actually-implemented rate at policy meetings at time t. Monetary policy rate changes at policy meetings at 
IV. Results
In this section, we present the results of estimations of our empirical model of the importance of voting records for future monetary policy. First, we provide the results for the full sample. Second, we provide the results for the restricted sample -the period of the global financial crisis (starting in August 2007).
IV.I Results for the Full Sample
We present our results on the extent to which voting records matter for the monetary policy rate set at the next meeting (in t+1) in Table 1 . The results suggest that voting records, proxied by our measure skew, are relevant to an understanding of future monetary policy. Skew is found to be significant even if we control for financial market expectations from one day before. 3 This result suggests that voting records add information about monetary policy for financial markets. This finding is in line with Gerlach-Kristen (2004) and Horvath et al. (2012a) .
One possible criticism of this analysis is that minutes and voting records are typically released together and that our results may therefore shed light on the importance of minutes rather than voting records. One way of thinking about this is that voting records represent quantitative summaries of the minutes of committee meetings.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that voting records are released separately from minutes in Poland (at least during our sample period). As a result, our findings for Poland suggest that voting records indeed contain new information for financial markets. Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Odd columns represent estimations of the difference between three-month and one-month interbank rates, and even columns represent estimations of the difference between one-year and three-month rates. T welve-month interbank rates in Poland have been published since 2001. T herefore, the number of observations in column (5) is larger than in column (6) . Data on the twelve-month interbank rate in Sweden are available through March 2013. Thus, the number of observations in column (8) is smaller than in column (7). Voting records for Poland run only through 2009:12 because subsequent data on whether individual board members dissented do not include the specific interest rates they voted for.
It is noteworthy that skew is significant at the 1% level for all countries except The independence of the Hungarian central bank has been extensively discussed in the media (see, for example, Reuters, 2014) , by the monetary authorities (ECB, 2014) and in academic research (Eijffinger et al., 2013a Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Odd columns represent estimations of the difference between three-month and one-month interbank rates, and even columns represent estimations of the difference between one-year and three-month rates. T welve-month interbank rates in Poland have been published since 2001. T herefore, the number of observations in column (5) is larger than in column (6) . Data on the twelve-month interbank rate in Sweden are available through March 2013. Thus, the number of observations in column (8) is smaller than in column (7). Voting records for Poland run only through 2009:12 because subsequent data on whether individual board members dissented do not include the specific interest rates they voted for.
In Table 2 , we provide results regarding whether voting records are informative about monetary policy rates two meetings ahead. The results largely confirm the findings presented in Table 1 , although the significance of skew for the Czech and Polish central banks varies somewhat. The regression fit is accordingly lower.
The results regarding the relevance of voting records to an understanding of monetary policy three meetings ahead are presented in Table 3 . Skew is no longer significant for central banks in Central Europe, and the predictability of monetary policy is thus highest for the central banks of Sweden and the UK. However, it is important to note that the difference in the frequency of monetary policy meetings in Sweden and UK. While the meetings are held at the monthly frequency in the UK, the frequency is bimonthly (the meetings are held six times per year) in Sweden.
Therefore, according to our results, the predictability of Swedish monetary policy goes well beyond three months. Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Odd columns represent estimations of the difference between three-month and one-month interbank rates, and even columns represent the difference between one-year and three-month rates. Twelve-month interbank rates in Poland have been published since 2001. Therefore, the number of observations in column (5) is larger than in column (6) . Data on the twelve-month interbank rate in Sweden are available through March 2013. T hus, the number of observations in column (8) is smaller than in column (7) . Voting records for Poland run only through 2009:12 because subsequent data on whether individual board members dissented do not include the specific interest rates they voted for.
Next, we examine to what extent the skew is (or is not) a noisy indicator. We calculate the conditional probability of policy rate change depending on the magnitude of skew. Suppose we have a board with seven members. We calculate the conditional probability of policy rate change in case zero, one, two or three members votes to decrease the policy rate by 25 basis points. Clearly, low probabilities for policy rate change suggest that skew is a noisy indicator. We present the results in Table 4 . The results are presented only for the case of policy meeting in t+1, the other two cases (t+2 and t+3) are largely similar and available upon request.
We observe that the probability of monetary policy rate change increases with the number of dissenting members. The probabilities seem to be adequate. For example, if one of the board members vote for lower rate of 25 basis points, while remaining eight members vote for the status quo, the conditional probability that the rates will be lowered at the next meeting is 0.1 in the case of the Bank of England. Once four members out of nine vote for lower policy rate, the conditional probability that the rates will be indeed reduced at the next meeting is of 0.45 for the Bank England. Note that the probability of 0.45 in the case of the Bank of England is no so low, as it may seem at the first sight. The high value of skew may persist for the next meeting (thus, without a change in the policy rate in t+1) and the rates may be decreased only at the meeting after the next meeting (in t+2).
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the conditional probabilities somewhat differ in different central banks. While we observe the conditional probability of 0.45 for the Bank England, the corresponding probability is 0.52 for the Czech National To summarize, our results show that the skew provides a correct prediction of the sign of future change in the policy rates but the skew indicator is somewhat noisy in the sense that its non-zero value does not automatically imply the policy rate change at the next monetary policy meeting. Nevertheless, if more board members dissent, the policy rate is likely to be changed soon.
IV.II Results for the Period of the Financial Crisis
In this subsection, we specifically examine the period of the global financial crisis.
The crisis was characterized by a high level of uncertainty, and conventional monetary policy (i.e., setting the short-term interest rate) was accompanied by various non-standard measures primarily intended to inject additional liquidity into banks and stabilize financial markets.
Interestingly, voting records remain relevant to an understanding of monetary policy at the next meeting, as the results in Table 5 suggest. Skew is again significant for all countries, except Hungary (the results for Poland should be interpreted with caution,
given the small number of observations). Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Odd columns represent estimations of the difference between three-month and one-month interbank rates, and even columns represent estimations of the difference between one-year and three-month rates. Twelve-month interbank rates in Poland have been published since 2001. Therefore, the number of observations in column (5) is larger than in column (6) . Data on the twelve-month interbank rate in Sweden are available through March 2013. Thus, the number of observations in column (8) is smaller than in column (7). Voting records for Poland run only through 2009:12 because subsequent data on whether individual board members dissented do not include the specific interest rates they voted for. The results for Poland not presented because of the low number of observations.
On the other hand, the results in Tables 6 and 7 show that voting records cannot predict monetary policy at more distant time horizons during the financial crisis.
With one exception, skew is not significant at conventional levels. This result is likely a consequence of increased economic uncertainty. In such situations, financial markets recognize that monetary policy making may differ from policy making in the tranquil periods preceding the crisis and that the signaling role of voting records is more limited. Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Odd columns represent estimations of the difference between the three-month and one-month interbank rate, and even columns represent the difference between one-year and three-month rates. Twelve-month interbank rates in Poland have been published since 2001. T herefore, the number of observations in column (5) is larger than in column (6) . Data on the twelve-month interbank rate in Sweden are available through March 2013. T hus, the number of observations in column (8) is smaller than in column (7). Voting records for Poland runs only through 2009:12 because subsequent data on whether individual board members dissented do not include the specific interest rates they voted for. T he results for Poland not presented because of the low number of observations. Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Odd columns represent estimations of the difference between three-month and one-month interbank rates, and even column represent the difference between one-year and three-month rates. Twelve-month interbank rates in Poland are published through 2001. T herefore, the number of observations in column (5) is larger than in column (6) . Data on the twelvemonth interbank rate in Sweden are available through March 2013. Thus, the number of observations in column (8) is smaller than in column (7) . Voting records for Poland run only through 2009:12 because subsequent data on whether individual board members dissented do not include the specific interest rates they voted for. The results for Poland not presented because of the low number of observations.
IV.III Further Robustness Checks
Finally, we carry out a series of additional robustness checks. First, we re-estimate the baseline regressions for the Czech National Bank and the Bank of England. The policy rates remained unchanged for extended time period during the financial crisis.
Therefore, our restricted sample for the Czech National Bank is 1998: 2-2010:5 and 1997:7-2009:3, respectively . The regression results based on the restricted sample remain largely unchanged and are available upon request.
Second, the error terms in the regressions can be correlated, as we try to explain the effect of skew on the monetary policy rate change in t+1, t+2 and t+3. As a result, we estimate the seemingly unrelated regressions for ordered probit model (therefore, accounting for the nature of our dependent variable). If error terms are correlated, this additional piece of information may decrease the estimated standard errors and eventually influence our conclusions whether (or not) skew is informative at more distant policy horizons. 
Meeting at t+1
Lagged rate change (1) is LR test of independent equations with a null hypothesis that the equations are independent.
The available code is able to estimate the bivariate regressions for the ordered dependent variables. We present the results in Tables 8-10 Third, we also estimate Eqs. (2)- (4) Forth, we assess our results on the conditional probabilities of policy rate change and how this probability depends on the size of skew. Instead of calculating the conditional probabilities of policy rate change, which are presented in Table 4 , we provide a simple "early bird" indicator. We define the dissent as of the "early bird" We would like to emphasize that our early bird analysis is positive rather than normative. Being the early bird does not mean that this central banker votes for the policy rate closer to the (unobserved) optimal policy rate. It merely signals the future policy rate changes. Interestingly, there are much less early birds in Hungary, which corresponds to our regression findings that skew does not matter for Hungarian central bank. Overall, this is in line with our analysis of the effect of the magnitude of skew on the conditional probability of policy rate change.
Fifth, we additionally include the "crisis" dummy into our regressions and reestimate our ordered probit model. The dummy takes the value of one from 2007:8 onwards, zero otherwise. The dummy is statistically significant in many cases but the significance of skew remains unchanged. These results are also available upon request.
V. Conclusions
We examine the voting records of five central banks ( Our results confirm findings of previous literature (see Gerlach-Kristen, 2004, and Horvath et al., 2012a) Next, we extended the previous literature, as we find that voting records are informative about policy rates set even two or three policy meetings ahead, unless the macroeconomic environment is too volatile. The probability of policy rate change increases with the number of dissenting votes. Skew is somewhat noisy indicator. If one board members votes for lower rate, the probability that the rate is decreased at the next meeting is not high. Nevertheless, if there are more dissenting members, the probability may increase substantially. This result suggests that it may benefit market participants to closely monitor the voting patterns of individual board members, especially those 'early birds' who propose changes in policy rates ahead of the majority.
More generally, our results show that enhancing the transparency of independent central banks through the release of (attributed or non-attributed) voting records is likely to increase monetary policy predictability.
APPENDIX Data Description

Voting record
We 2.1998 27.8.1998 15.1.1999 27.5.1999 21.12.1999 27.7.2000 22.2.2001 27.9.2001 28.3.2002 26.9.2002 24.4 27.6.2001 28.11.2001 24.4.2002 19.7.2002 23.10.2002 26.2.2003 28.5.2003 30.6.2004 30.3.2005 27.7.2005 28.2.2006 19.12.2006 25.4.2007 25.7.2007 28.11.2007 27.2.2008 28.5.2008 27.8.2008 23.12.2008 NBP Note: The figure depicts our dependent variable. Time is on the x axis. 1999 11.3.1999 20.5.1999 26.8.1999 3.2.2000 16.8.2000 26.4.2001 15.10.2001 5.6.2002 4.12.2002 3.7.2003 31.3.2004 13.10.2004 20.6.2005 22.2.2006 14.12.2006 6.9.2007 2.7.2008 10.2.2009 15.12.2009 25.10.2010 6.9.2011 3.7.2012 16.4.2013 12.2.2014 6 19.2.1998 13.8.1998 17.12.1998 25.3.1999 2.9.1999 24.2.2000 31.8.2000 22.2.2001 30.8.2001 31.1.2002 11.7.2002 19.12.2002 25.6.2003 17.12 27.6.2001 28.11.2001 24.4.2002 19.7.2002 23.10.2002 26.2.2003 28.5.2003 30.6.2004 30.3.2005 27.7.2005 28.2.2006 19.12.2006 25.4.2007 25.7.2007 28.11.2007 27.2.2008 28.5.2008 27.8.2008 23.12.2008 28.2.2001 27.6.2001 28.11.2001 24.4.2002 19.7.2002 23.10.2002 26.2.2003 28.5.2003 30.6.2004 30.3.2005 27.7.2005 28.2.2006 19.12.2006 25.4.2007 25.7.2007 28.11.2007 27.2.2008 28.5.2008 27.8.2008 23.12.2008 Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Odd columns represent estimations of the difference between three-month and one-month interbank rates, and even columns represent the difference between one-year and three-month rates. Twelve-month interbank rates in Poland have been published since 2001. Therefore, the number of observations in column (5) is larger than in column (6) . These results replicate those in Horvath et al. (2012a) . Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Odd columns represent estimations of the difference between three-month and one-month interbank rates, and even columns represent the difference between one-year and three-month rates. Twelve-month interbank rates in Poland have been published since 2001. Therefore, the number of observations in column (5) is larger than in column (6). Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Odd columns represent estimations of the difference between three-month and one-month interbank rates, and even columns represent the difference between one-year and three-month rates. Twelve-month interbank rates in Poland have been published since 2001. Therefore, the number of observations in column (5) is larger than in column (6). 
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